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THE YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM
NOVEMBER 4, 2019

Nudges and Norms in Multidistrict Litigation: A
Response to Engstrom
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch
abstract. On paper, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply equally to billion-dollar opioid allegations and claims for $75,000.01. In practice, however, judges and attorneys in high-stakes
multidistrict proceedings like those over opioids have invented a smattering of procedures you will
never ﬁnd in the Federal Rules: plaintiff fact sheets, short-form complaints, science days, bellwether trials, census orders, inactive dockets, and Lone Pine orders, to name but a few. In a world
where settlement is the prevailing currency, new norms take root. But as these norms blossom, the
stabilizing features of the federal rules—balance, predictability, and structural protections—can
wither. As safeguards atrophy and transferee judges actively nudge the parties to settle, the deals
that emerge may reﬂect the scars of creative pruning, not the suit’s merits.
This Essay responds to Nora Engstrom’s article, The Lessons of Lone Pine, by introducing empirical data on her target (Lone Pine orders) and her remedy (plaintiff fact sheets). Examining
these two innovations in the lifecycle of products-liability multidistrict litigation illustrates that
norms can undermine a key aim of the Federal Rules: achieving procedural parity, where discovery
burdens and the risks of erroneous decisions fall equally on both parties. Although procedural
design choices should respond to case-management demands, both shortcuts can impact plaintiffs
more harshly, upending protections for those who need them most.

introduction
The world of mass-tort multidistrict litigation that Nora Engstrom describes
in her recent Yale Law Journal Article, The Lessons of Lone Pine, is foreign to most
lawyers.1 These proceedings command not only their own lingo, like Lone Pine
orders, census orders, and fact sheets, but also their own bespoke procedures,

1.
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which an elite cadre of federal judges invoke to wrangle cases into settlement.2
That means that a key assumption behind the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—
that “a litigant can walk into any federal courtroom in the country and know that
the same procedures will apply to her case”—does not ring true.3 For the uninitiated, Lone Pine orders require mass-tort plaintiffs to prove that the defendant’s
product or device caused their injuries with an expert report, such as one from a
surgeon or physician.4 As a judicial concoction, Lone Pine orders are the pluots
of mass torts, grafting together snippets of federal rules while ignoring their procedural protections.5
In stark contrast to most existing literature lauding Lone Pine orders, Engstrom deftly exposes their deep ﬂaws: Lone Pine orders circumvent jury trials,
little precedent exists to guide them, and, as a case-management tool under Rule
16, they are afforded an abuse-of-discretion standard on appeal rather than the
stricter de novo standard used for summary judgment.6 Put simply, Lone Pine
orders bypass institutional constraints and are out of step with existing procedural rules. Like summary-judgment motions, they demand substantive support
for claims, but they short-circuit Rule 56’s procedural protections and clear burdens of proof. And like Rule 11 sanctions, they hope to siphon off frivolous
claims, but they demand that plaintiffs provide expert reports and prima facie
evidence of their injury, whereas Rule 11 merely requires that lawyers certify that

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Some transferee judges in federal multidistrict proceedings have begun to issue census orders
(or registration orders) at the settling parties’ request. These require all attorneys to register
their clients’ state and federal claims, whether ﬁled or unﬁled, so that the settling defendant
can use that number as the denominator for calculating compliance with a settlement’s walkaway percentage. (They are, of course dubious, because federal jurisdiction attaches to claims,
not lawyers.) I explore walkaway provisions in note 31, infra, and the accompanying text. Fact
sheets are court-ordered forms that sometimes act as a substitute for more formal discovery
tools like interrogatories, requests to produce documents, and depositions. I take a closer look
at plaintiff fact sheets in Part II, infra, but judges have used fact sheets for both plaintiffs and
defendants in multidistrict proceedings.
Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1687 (2017). As Engstrom explains,
Lone Pine orders have been used in state courts, too, but my focus here is on federal cases.
To recover in tort, plaintiffs must prove that the defendant’s product, device, or action proximately caused her injuries. The expert report by a doctor or specialist, for example, thus helps
plaintiffs link their injury to the defendant’s action or inaction and prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence.
For other examples, see Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 767 (2017); Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L.
REV. 389 (2011).
See Engstrom, supra note 1, at 36-52.
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support exists or is likely to exist after discovery.7 Finally, like discovery sanctions
under Rule 37, Lone Pine orders dismiss noncompliant cases, but contrary to this
Rule they do so as a ﬁrst step rather than a last resort.
Why do judges use them then? Some judges and defense lawyers claim that
Lone Pine orders “represent salvation from the huddled masses of meritless
plaintiffs’ claims lying in wait for eventual settlement checks.”8 With that in
mind, Engstrom suggests a balance: judges should use Lone Pine orders sparingly and “only when (1) procedures explicitly sanctioned by rule or statute are
unavailable or are patently insufficient, and (2) substantial evidence casts doubt
upon plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief and/or the plaintiffs have displayed a
marked and unjustiﬁable lack of diligence.”9 In lieu of Lone Pine orders, Engstrom contends that judges should winnow claims by requiring plaintiff fact
sheets and disincentivizing noncompliance, “with a ﬁrst step being that . . . noncompliant plaintiffs will face entry of a Lone Pine order, and those who fail to
comply with that order will see their claims dismissed with prejudice.”10
Engstrom’s article is a tour-de-force on Lone Pine orders and should be required reading for every transferee judge who handles a mass-tort multidistrict
litigation (MDL). Her dataset includes a wide array of Lone Pine orders used in
both state and federal courts, many of which were issued during discovery and
before a proceeding settled.11
Volume-wise, state courts handle more mass-tort cases than federal courts
do. But once the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the Panel) centralizes
federal cases before a transferee judge, that judge and the attorneys she selects to
spearhead the MDL proceeding tend to be in the driver’s seat when it comes to
negotiating a global settlement. As Part I explores, global deals aim to include all
plaintiffs, regardless of whether they sued in state or federal court.
Part I thus narrows the scope of our inquiry, shifting away from how all state
and federal courts use Lone Pine orders to how transferee judges employ them in
products-liability MDLs. Products liability encompasses the largest and thorniest mass torts, like asbestos and pelvic mesh, which tend to demand heavy-

7.

ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS: BACKROOM BARGAINING IN MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION 129-30 (2019).
8. Engstrom, supra note 1, at 22 (citing Rachel B. Weil, Knee Implant MDL Judge Enters Aggressive
Lone Pine Order, DRUG & DEVICE L. (June 23, 2016), https://www.druganddevicelawblog
.com/2016/06/10720.html [https://perma.cc/JY86-GJPJ].
9. Engstrom, supra note 1, at 12.
10. Id. at 60.
11. See Nora Freeman Engstrom & Amos Espeland, Lone Pine Orders: A Critical Examination and
Empirical Analysis (unpublished paper on ﬁle with author).
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handed case management.12 Corralling dispersed plaintiffs into a single settlement framework takes some doing, and ethics rules can take a backseat to closure
goals.13 Looking at the lifecycle of mass torts in that context shows that Lone Pine
orders appear almost exclusively post-settlement—not as pre-settlement sieves,
but as an additional means to urge non-settling plaintiffs to settle.14
Repositioning Lone Pine orders as settlement nudges means that they should
fail the ﬁrst prong of Engstrom’s test, for tried-and-true procedures already exist
to resolve cases without them. When plaintiffs refuse a settlement offer, nothing
about the status quo should change. Non-settling plaintiffs should be able to
continue their path toward trial. If they have not completed discovery, then discovery should continue. If they don’t respond to discovery requests, then the
court could consider whether to issue Rule 37 sanctions and dismiss the case.
Alternatively, if pretrial matters have concluded, plaintiffs’ cases should be remanded to their original court for trial as the MDL statute contemplates.15
Part II explores Engstrom’s proposed solution—using plaintiff fact sheets in
lieu of Lone Pine orders. Unlike Lone Pine orders, fact sheets do appear routinely
before a global settlement. But, as yet another ad hoc invention that substitutes
for formal discovery rules, they fall prey to some of the same criticisms that Engstrom levels at Lone Pine orders.

12.

I focus on product-liability MDLs because that category captures the personal-injury mass
torts that tend to include the most plaintiffs. Historically, products-liability proceedings have
constituted the largest segment of MDLs, constituting well over one-third of the Panel’s
docket. And looking at the number of actions contained in each proceeding shows that products-liability cases comprise around 90% of pending actions. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch &
Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1460-63 (2017). Transvaginal mesh, or “pelvic mesh” as it has become
known, is a product used to treat pelvic organ prolapse, but the mesh can pierce women’s
internal organs and wreak havoc on their bodies. Even revision surgeries may not be successful because the mesh can splinter internally. Most pelvic mesh has now been pulled from the
market.
13. For more on these practices, see BURCH, supra note 7, at 44-54, 60-62.
14. Erin Marie Day, Lawyers Debate Value of ‘Lone Pine’ Orders, LAW360 (July 24, 2008),
https://www.law360.com/articles/63725/lawyers-debate-value-of-lone-pine-orders
[https://perma.cc/WLF2-C92U] (quoting Chris Seeger on Lone Pine orders as saying, “Many
judges won’t enter them at all, but of those that do, it’s always near the end of the case”).
Engstrom notes that 38% of the courts in her dataset entered Lone Pine orders early in the
litigation and only 24% used them later in the proceeding. See id. at 14.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2018) (“Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or
before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred . . . .”).
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i. lone pine orders as settlement nudges
As Engstrom points out, there is widespread agreement that not all masstort plaintiffs have valid claims, even though no ﬁrm data exists on the topic.16
But if plaintiffs’ attorneys ﬁle dubious claims, it’s with the hope of getting some
small payout from a settlement grid—a volume game that they would lose if they
withheld those claims from a settlement program.17 So, if transferee judges issue
Lone Pine orders after lead attorneys negotiate a settlement, those orders are unlikely to weed out suspicious claims and more likely to push reluctant plaintiffs
to settle by raising litigation costs and signaling judicial approval of the deal.
Using a dataset of products-liability MDLs that settled over the course of
fourteen years,18 I found that judges in sixteen of thirty-four proceedings issued
Lone Pine orders, or 47%. Of those, ﬁfteen (93.7%) issued them after the ﬁrst
settlement date. This suggests that, at least in these MDL proceedings, Lone Pine

16.

Some lawyers have attributed this phenomenon to the role of lead generators and Internet
advertising. Paul D. Rheingold, Multidistrict Litigation Mass Terminations for Failure to Prove
Causation, ABA, (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/mass-torts/articles/2019/summer2019-multidistrict-litigation-mass-terminations-forfailure-to-prove-causation [https://perma.cc/2A5P-GZRP].
17. Settlements typically include “grids,” which group claimants by injury category and payouts.
18. My dataset includes all products-liability proceedings pending on the MDL docket as of May
2013 that concluded in a private, aggregate settlement before May 2018 (thirty-four of the
seventy-three proceedings, except the asbestos litigation, for which early electronic records
were unavailable). See Figure 2 for those outcomes. I have recently made all of the data and
documents publicly available and searchable at MDL Docs, U. GA. SCH. L., https://mdl
.law.uga.edu [https://perma.cc/W4Y2-CJWL]. Focusing on aggregate settlements ﬁltered
out class actions and homed in on personal-injury proceedings, which are more likely to require innovative case-management techniques such as Lone Pine orders and plaintiff fact
sheets. Those thirty-four proceedings settled over the course of fourteen years and collectively
resolved 190,875 actions.
This dataset is the subject of MASS TORT DEALS: BACKROOM BARGAINING IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 223-26 (2019), except that I further updated and reﬁned my research in this
Essay to include recently-issued Lone Pine orders and to exclude most “show cause” orders,
which the book included. I looked on the MDL dockets for orders that judges either labeled
as “Lone Pine orders” (or referred to as such in subsequent transcripts) or that required plaintiffs to provide prima facie evidence of causation (typically with an expert report). I did include the ﬁrst of several show cause orders from Zimmer Durom Hip Cup. The judge in that
proceeding speciﬁed that she issued the order “[f]or the reasons set forth on the record,” but
that transcript is currently unavailable. Order Granting Zimmer, Inc. and Zimmer Holdings,
Inc.’s Motion for Order to Show Cause, In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 2:09-cv-04414-SDW-MCA (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2019). Subsequent information may suggest
excluding it. For information on Engstrom’s dataset, see Engstrom & Espeland, supra note 11,
at 9-10.
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orders do not winnow meritless claims pre-settlement.19 It’s the settlement’s
claims administrators who decide which claims warrant compensation, not
judges. Of course, not all noncompensable claims are “meritless”; some may
simply fall outside the strict parameters that settling parties negotiate. In the
massive Vioxx settlement, for example, the claims administrator asked for additional information on 256 potentially fraudulent claims, and did not get a response on 194.20 Of the sixty-two who responded, thirty-nine overcame the initial suspicion (46%), and Judge Fallon later reported that only two out of 50,000
claims were fraudulent.21
Looking at the bigger picture, the ﬁrst settlements in those thirty-four proceedings occurred, on average, 1,234 days (or three years and 4.5 months) after
the Panel centralized them. And the judges who issued Lone Pine orders within
those proceedings did so on average 1,411 days (or three years and 10.3 months)
after centralization.22 Although not all of the proceedings have closed and the
difference is not statistically signiﬁcant in this sample, closed proceedings with
Lone Pine orders ended no sooner than those without them. More speciﬁcally,
the ten closed proceedings that issued Lone Pine orders concluded an average of
3,304 days (or a little over nine years) after centralization, whereas the eight proceedings that did not issue them closed an average of 2,904 days (or less than
eight years) after centralization—over a year sooner.23

19.

20.

21.
22.
23.

Only Fosamax issued a pre-settlement Lone Pine order, though it issued a second one after a
global settlement as well. Pre-settlement Lone Pine Order, In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 06-MD-1789 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2012); Lone Pine Order, In re Fosamax, No. 06-MD-1789
(S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014). This ﬁnding is consistent with Engstrom’s. See Engstrom & Espeland, supra note 11, at 14 (“Generally, these twilight orders were issued in the MDL context,
after the lead plaintiffs’ attorneys had hammered out a tentative settlement agreement and
were, often in concert with the defendant, trying to corral the remaining plaintiffs to opt in.”).
Report by the Claims Administrator on Potentially Fraudulent Claims Filed in the Nationwide Vioxx Consumer Settlement Program, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-md-01657
(E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2015). Proceedings, like those over pelvic mesh, that settle on an “inventory,”
or ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm basis, may be different. But thus far in those proceedings, Judge Joseph Goodwin has not used Lone Pine orders.
Status Conference at 59, In re Vioxx, No. 05-md-1657 (E.D. La. July 27, 2010).
See infra Appendix Table A1 for detailed information.
Closed proceedings using Lone Pine orders included an average of 3,304 actions, versus 2,904
average actions for closed proceedings that did not use them. This suggests that judges may
be more inclined to issue Lone Pine orders in larger proceedings.
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Figure 1.

timeline of mdl events within the dataset24

As Figure 1 illustrates, 97.3% of these Lone Pine orders applied post-settlement
only to non-settling plaintiffs. If Lone Pine orders do not screen cases pre-settlement, then judges must issue them for a different reason entirely. As twilight
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orders that follow on the heels of a private deal, Engstrom aptly observes that
these Lone Pine orders can have a “dark side”—“to strongarm claimants to accede
to a settlement agreement that they would rather refuse.”25 Thus, any study of
Lone Pine orders in mass-tort MDLs must begin with an understanding of how
those private settlements work, a task to which we now turn.
A. Settlement Dynamics in MDLs
Settlement designers in both mass-tort deals and class-action settlements
want to include as many people as possible to give defendants all-inclusive relief.
Class-action settlements can work like sticky ﬂypaper: dealmakers aim to keep
class members from opting out through most-favored nation provisions, walkaway clauses, and even liens on the defendant’s assets in favor of settling class
members.26 Inertia helps. Class members are bound by the deal unless they opt
out, so the default position promotes closure for defendants. Yet, Rule 23 includes some safeguards for absent class members—notice, opt-out rights, objections, judicial settlement approval, and adequate representation.27
But imagine a scenario without those class-action protections, where a client
becomes a number, not a name, and is represented by the same attorney who
represents hundreds of others. Imagine further that only one common factual
question is needed to centralize those cases before the same judge and that the
judge does not appoint lead plaintiffs’ lawyers to ensure that they adequately
represent the spectrum of competing interests. Instead, judges appoint leaders
based on attorneys’ expertise, tendency to cooperate with others, and ability to
fund the suits.28 That’s what happens before mass torts conclude in private, aggregate settlements, as 47.9% of all products-liability proceedings in the dataset
ultimately did. Unlike class settlements, where everyone is automatically “in,”
plaintiffs’ attorneys must convince their clients to settle—to affirmatively act—

24.

25.
26.

27.

28.

Products-liability proceedings see some major events that can affect their duration. Looking
over a proceeding’s lifecycle shows when these events occur and how quickly they facilitate
closure. My deepest thanks to Margaret S. Williams for creating this visual.
Engstrom, supra note 1, at 36.
See e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 149, 204-19 (2003). For more detail on the effects of walkaway clauses in
MDLs, see Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV.
67, 92-94 (2017).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Not that class actions are perfect—far from it. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneﬁcial
Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2002) (scrutinizing the role of the plaintiffs’ attorneys and
ultimately rejecting a collusive class-action settlement).
BURCH, supra note 7, at 90-96; Burch & Williams, supra note 12, at 1460-63.
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to satisfy defendants’ closure goals. That is where the ethical conundrums and
the “dark side” that Engstrom alludes to begin.
Figure 2.

how do product-liability mdls end?29

Understanding how these deals work requires a bit of terminology and explanation. In this context, the word “settlement” is a misnomer—the private
agreements do not actually settle anything. They are deals between the lead
plaintiffs’ lawyers and the defendant that set up settlement programs. This is key,
because the terms require plaintiffs’ lawyers to do a little arm-twisting before an
actual settlement occurs.30
For example, every publicly available private deal in the dataset included a
“walkaway” clause, meaning that the defendant could abandon the settlement

29.
30.
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See infra Appendix Table A2 for detailed information.
BURCH, supra note 7, at 40-54.
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offer if too few plaintiffs signed up.31 To measure compliance and identify the
denominator for the walkaway percentage, some leaders request a “census” order, as Figure 1 showed. Although lead lawyers could count federal cases on their
own, they want a full roll call that identiﬁes state-court plaintiffs and unﬁled
claims. So they enlist the court’s help: judges in 35% of the thirty-four proceedings required attorneys to register all of their clients, regardless of where (or
whether) they ﬁled those claims.32
Meeting walkaway percentages, which require between 85% and 100% of
plaintiffs to enter the program, means plaintiffs’ lawyers must corral as many
clients as possible or risk blowing up the offer and not getting paid.33 Entering
the program, however, requires plaintiffs to dismiss their lawsuit with prejudice.34 Yet, in 60% of the private settlements, plaintiffs had little idea how
much—if anything—they would actually receive.35 Informed consent is therefore
a stretch.36
That takes out carrots and leaves us with the real stick: ethically dubious
clauses that require plaintiffs’ attorneys to recommend that all of their clients
settle and to withdraw from representing clients who refuse.37 Non-settling clients ﬁnd themselves between a rock and a hard place.38 In corresponding with
pelvic-mesh plaintiffs as part of an ongoing study,39 for example, one plaintiff
told me “I let [my law ﬁrm] know that I do NOT want them to dismiss my case
31.
32.
33.
34.

35.

36.

37.
38.
39.

Ten of the thirty-four proceedings ending in private, aggregate settlements made those settlements publicly available. Three of the ten had two settlements each, for a total of thirteen.
BURCH, supra note 7, at 118.
Id. at 44-45.
It thus becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible depending on the proceeding, to tell
whether a dismissal on the docket results from entering into a settlement program or failing
to comply with a court order.
BURCH, supra note 7, at 140; Paul D. Rheingold, In Mass Torts, Who Speaks for the Individual
Plaintiffs?, LEGAL CURRENT (Feb. 23, 2017), http://www.legalcurrent.com/in-mass-torts
-who-speaks-for-the-individual-plaintiffs [https://perma.cc/ZC59-JGAR] (“As I consider
recent settlements, many were so complex and mechanistic that I could not predict what my
clients would get by way of settlement—yet, they had to sign a release as a pre-condition for
entering into the settlement plan.”).
BURCH, supra note 7, at 137-44; Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus
Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 281-92 (2011); Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Issues in Mass Tort
Plaintiffs’ Representation: Beyond the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3233, 325257 (2013).
Burch & Williams, supra note 12, at 1502-08.
BURCH, supra note 7, at 43-54; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation,
70 VAND. L. REV. 67, 90-102 (2017).
This project will be ongoing at least until the end of November 2019. Procedural Justice Study
on Women’s Health Multidistrict Litigation, ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH, https://
www.elizabethchambleeburch.com/womens-mdls [https://perma.cc/NJ8D-ASGZ].
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[to enter a settlement program]. They have told me that means I will likely be
dropped from them . . . . Right now they are trying to bully me, and that just
isn’t working!”40
To make matters worse, these mandatory recommendation and withdrawal
provisions tend to appear alongside simultaneous agreements for attorneys not
to solicit or accept new clients.41 So, if that plaintiff declined to settle and her
attorney withdrew from representing her, she may have to proceed pro se—not
a simple task for injured plaintiffs laden with medical bills, especially when Lone
Pine orders demand expensive expert proof.42
Withdrawing from representing a client midstream typically necessitates judicial approval.43 In 35% of the thirty-four proceedings, judges acquiesced. Others were “systematic in not permitting withdrawal.”44 Adaptive lawyers, however, have engineered workarounds in their contingency-fee agreements. Some
build escape hatches: one ﬁrm incorporated an exit clause that allowed it to get
out of its client obligations at any time.45 Others include deterrents: one ﬁrm
required a client to reimburse it for her litigation expenses if she went against
counsel’s settlement advice and insisted on going to trial but ultimately lost.46
As Judge Jack B. Weinstein recognized, “[t]heoretically, each client has the
option of rejecting his share of a settlement . . . . In practice, the attorney almost
always can make a global settlement and convince the clients to accept it.”47 But
as the terms Lone Pine orders, census orders, and withdrawal orders suggest,

40.

41.
42.
43.

44.
45.

46.

47.
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Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Updated: When Trial is Too “Expensive” for Law Firms, MASS TORT
LITIG. BLOG (Apr. 25, 2019), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mass_tort_litigation
/2019/04/updated-when-trial-is-too-expensive-for-law-ﬁrms.html [https://perma.cc/EZB7
-6AGD].
BURCH, supra note 7, at 50-53.
BURCH, supra note 7, at 46-52.
Of the thirteen private settlements that were publicly available, 53% contained withdrawal
provisions. BURCH, supra note 7, at 45 (including Propulsid I & II, Vioxx, Fosamax, and American Medical Systems, which require a certain percentage of plaintiffs to participate, and DePuy
ASR I & II, which allows the defendant to expel noncompliant law ﬁrms).
Transcript of Status Conference at 16, In re Fresenius GranuFlo/Naturalyte Dialysate Prods.
Liab. Litig. (D. Mass. Dec. 14, 2016).
See e.g., Complaint at 34, Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement, Plummer v. McSweeney, No.
4:18-cv-00063 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 24, 2018) (“Counsel may withdraw from Client’s representation at any time, upon reasonable written notice to Client at Client’s last known address.”).
Motley Rice LLC Contract of Representation at ¶ 7 (“Should Motley Rice and/or co-counsel
recommend settling my claims(s) but I elect to proceed to trial, if no monetary damages are
recovered at trial, my attorneys will have the right to collect from me reasonable expenses
incurred in this litigation.”) (on ﬁle with author).
Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 521 n.212
(1994).
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attorneys are not alone in their settlement-inducing endeavor. Judges nudge too.
In 64.7% of those thirty-four proceedings, judges formally appointed the private
claims administrator or settlement master.48 And, to varying degrees, 52.9% “approved” the private settlements despite having no formal statutory authority to
do so.49
Approving settlements and appointing claims administrators imprints the
deal with a judicial imprimatur. In the In re Fresenius GranuFlo litigation, Judge
Douglas Woodlock observed, “it is nice to be asked to provide an imprimatur,”
but “[it is] to some degree not my responsibility to provide imprimaturs to various kinds of things [like appointing a settlement master] . . . . I try not to exercise my jurisdiction when . . . it is the judicial equivalent of a blurb on the back
of a new best seller.”50
But 52.9% of judges felt differently. Judicially endorsing a private deal legitimizes it. Yet none of those proceedings adversarially aired the deal’s pros and
cons. Judges did not write an opinion reasoning through whether the settlement
was fair, reasonable, or adequate, as they would in approving a class settlement.
Nor did they decide whether lead lawyers adequately represented plaintiffs with
conﬂicting interests.51 In some instances, judges blessed the deal before ever ruling on the merits: judges in only 50% of those thirty-four proceedings had made
at least three merits-related rulings (summary judgment, Daubert motions, class
certiﬁcation, or presiding over a bellwether trial) before the ﬁrst settlement and
any subsequent Lone Pine order occurred.52 In four proceedings, judges issued
post-settlement Lone Pine orders without making a single merits-related ruling
beforehand.53
B. Lone Pine Orders in MDLs
The Pradaxa suits aptly illustrate how Lone Pine orders enter into MDL case
management and settlement dynamics. In Pradaxa, Judge David Herndon never
held a bellwether trial nor ruled on summary judgment, Daubert, or class
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

BURCH, supra note 7, at 116-17.
Id. at 104-119, 130-33 (discussing judges’ lack of authority to endorse private settlements).
Transcript of Status Conference at 6-7, In re Fresenius GranuFlo/Naturalyte Dialysate Prods.
Liab. Litig. (D. Mass. Apr. 29, 2016).
BURCH, supra note 7, at 90-96.
Id. at 110.
Those proceedings included In re Avandia Mktg. Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07MD-1871 (E.D. Pa.); In re Gadolinium-Based Contrast Agents Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 1:08
GD 50000 (N.D. Ohio); In re Ortho Evra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-cv-40000 (N.D.
Ohio); In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-2385-DRHSCW (S.D. Ill.); see also BURCH, supra note 7, at 246-65.
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certiﬁcation.54 He urged the parties to settle and, once they did, issued a ﬂurry
of orders. He stayed the proceeding, which meant nonsettling plaintiffs could
not continue discovery or have their cases remanded.55 He issued a census so that
all attorneys with a case before him had to include eleven categories of information for all of their clients—regardless of where (or even whether) they had
ﬁled suit, and regardless of whether the client wanted to settle.56
Judge Herndon then appointed the private claims administrator and imposed additional discovery burdens on non-settling plaintiffs via a Lone Pine order.57 Under the order, non-settling plaintiffs had approximately ﬁfteen days after the settlement’s opt-in deadline to produce fact sheets, affidavits, and
pharmacy and medical records dating back to ﬁve years before their alleged injury occurred. In total, plaintiffs had a little over two months to comply with the
Lone Pine order by producing an expert report on both general and speciﬁc causation. If they failed, they had just twenty days to ﬁx the deﬁciency—a deadline
that could not be extended.58
That is the Lone Pine order’s power. Perhaps now we can see those twilight
orders for what they are in MDLs: a cleanup device, not a screening tool. Colorfully described by plaintiffs’ leadership as “a post-settlement mop-up procedure,” and by defendants as a “put up or shut up” device, settlement designers
use Lone Pine orders to signal that plaintiffs should either settle or prepare to
prove their claims immediately without the procedural protections of summary
judgment.59
With Lone Pine orders positioned as MDL settlements’ billy club, I would go
further than Engstrom and suggest that they should fail her test per se in the
MDL context. She suggests that judges must use Lone Pine orders only as a last
resort when no other tools suffice, or when credible evidence casts doubt on

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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BURCH, supra note 7, at 110-13.
Minute Order, In re Pradaxa, No. 3:12-MD-02385-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. May 28, 2014).
Case Management Order No. 77, In re Pradaxa, No. 3:12-MD-02385-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill.
May 29, 2014).
Case Management Order No. 78, In re Pradaxa, No. 3:12-MD-02385-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill.
May 29, 2014); BURCH, supra note 7, at 110-13.
Case Management Order No. 78, supra note 57. Appendix Table A1 includes the timeframe
that other courts have used for issuing similar orders.
Order, In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. July 30,
2014) (quoting Plaintiffs Steering Committee’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Opposition to Defendant Merck’s Motion for Entry of Lone Pine Order at 7, In re Fosamax,
No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2012)); Transcript of Proceedings at 59, In
re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391–RLM-CAN
(N.D. Ind. May 18, 2015) (quoting defense attorney John Winter).
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some or all of plaintiffs’ claims (or dilatory plaintiffs persist).60 But ready-made
rules and statutory remands exist for all non-settling MDL plaintiffs. So, there
is no need for Lone Pine orders to function as a gap ﬁller.61 And, as Engstrom
readily notes, “a plaintiff’s refusal to acquiesce to a global settlement should
inform neither prong of the analysis.”62
Claims that remain post-settlement tend to stem from one of two kinds of
plaintiffs: nonresponsive plaintiffs63 or plaintiffs who want a trial. Lone Pine
orders do not distinguish between the two. They hit both with a heavy
procedural burden that mimics summary judgment but lacks its safeguards.
Separating these categories shows that existing procedures aptly address both
situations, meaning that Lone Pine orders would not survive Engstrom’s ﬁrst
hurdle.
First, when nonresponsive plaintiffs refuse to settle, their cases should still
be in discovery.64 If plaintiffs refuse to respond to discovery queries, Rule 37
supplies a series of steps and sanctions: attempts to confer in good faith, an order
compelling disclosure or a response, then an array of possible sanctions that
range from deeming disputed facts established to dismissing the action.
Second, when non-settling plaintiffs want to try their cases, they will
respond to discovery requests and should be able to return to their original
district once pretrial matters conclude. After all, multidistrict litigation is
supposed to be for pretrial purposes only.65 In practice, however, only around
3% of all actions transferred have ever been remanded.66
As Judge Eduardo Robreno, who handled and remanded many of the
asbestos cases, explained, “As a matter of judicial culture, remanding cases is
viewed as an acknowledgement that the MDL judge has failed to resolve the
case . . . .”67 That stigma should change. But vanity is no excuse for a Lone Pine
order, especially when remanding cases can perform the same function. Once

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

67.

Engstrom, supra note 1, at 54-55.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 56 n.231.
Plaintiffs’ nonresponsiveness may result from counsel’s poor job of keeping up with her
clients.
In practice, nonsettling plaintiffs face a discovery stay—another tool that pushes settlement.
BURCH, supra note 7, at 119, 258-65.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2018).
See Table S-20: Cumulative Summary of Multidistrict Litigation During the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30, 2016 Through 2018, U.S. COURTS (2018), https://www.uscourts.gov
/sites/default/ﬁles/data_tables/jb_s20_0930.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ATN-2YV3].
Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict Litigation (MDL-875):
Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97, 144 (2013).

77

the yale law journal forum

November 4, 2019

remanded, a defendant can move for summary judgment on speciﬁc causation
and, if the plaintiff prevails, she can insist on her day in court.68
ii. a critical look at plaintiff fact sheets
Siphoning claims pre-settlement falls to another judicially concocted order:
plaintiff fact sheets. Unlike party-driven discovery devices in routine cases, this
judge-issued order requires plaintiffs to provide defendants with speciﬁc
information about their individual claims, circumstances, and injuries. As Figure
1 illustrates, all but one of the thirty-four proceedings (97%) used a plaintiff fact
sheet. Engstrom suggests that streamlined fact sheets “have effectively culled
meritless claims” with less expense and fewer disadvantages than Lone Pine
orders.69
As I explain in this Part, however, I have reservations: like Lone Pine orders,
fact sheets short circuit tried-and-true discovery rules as well as their built-in
protections and limits. As they have evolved over time, some have become
increasingly burdensome. Once again, that burden tends to fall
disproportionately on plaintiffs.
Like Engstrom, I see some upside to narrowly tailored fact sheets: they give
both sides data on the proceeding’s scope in terms of claims, damages, and
numbers. When centralized into a repository that the judge can access, they can
help select representative bellwether cases. And, once a plaintiffs’ steering
committee decides which claims to develop and pursue, they can identify cases
falling outside those parameters that should be remanded without having to wait
for the MDL to run its course.70 Perhaps they winnow cases, too. But apart from
a preliminary report by the Federal Judicial Center, there has been no systematic
study documenting fact sheets’ use or effect.71
Overall, I have two concerns. First, I worry about the cumulative impact ad
hoc procedures have on plaintiffs. And second, I worry about Engstrom’s

68.

BURCH, supra note 7, at 207-15 (promoting the use of episodic remands).
Engstrom, supra note 1, at 58.
70. BURCH, supra note 7, at 207-15 (promoting the use of episodic remands for plaintiffs who fall
outside the scope of the claims the steering committee decides to develop).
71. The Federal Judicial Center prepared a study for the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, which showed docket evidence of dismissals in 55% of the proceedings in
which judges ordered fact sheets. Margaret S. Williams et al., Plaintiff Fact Sheets in Multidistrict Litigation: Products Liability Proceedings 2008-2018, FED. JUD. CTR. 4 (Mar. 2019),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/materials/49/PFS%20in%20MDL.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/JZ3V-EADN]. An in-depth study of fact sheets is coming soon. Margaret S. Williams & Jason A. Cantone, Fact Sheets in Mass Tort Multidistrict Litigation Proceedings, 20082018 (forthcoming) (on ﬁle with author).
69.
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recommendation that courts strengthen the consequences for plaintiffs who do
not comply with fact sheet orders. As I explore in this Part, plaintiffs’ attorneys
may not communicate with their clients as much as we would hope and even
diligent plaintiffs may face barriers to obtaining their medical records. So,
raising the stakes for noncompliance by subjecting plaintiffs to a Lone Pine order
and then dismissing their claims with prejudice may be unjust.72
Like other ad hoc inventions, fact sheets lack standardization and are only
loosely tethered to the discovery rules. They thus suffer from two of the
pathologies that Engstrom identiﬁed with Lone Pine orders—they are
inconsistent and unpredictable, and may be out of step with the formal
procedural scheme.73
First, plaintiff fact sheets ﬂuctuate in timing, name, compliance, content, and
consequences. As plaintiffs face ever-changing burdens and deadlines, concerns
arise about treating like plaintiffs alike. Although nearly all judges in my dataset
ordered fact sheets, they did so at different times, ranging from forty-ﬁve to
1,084 days after the Panel centralized the proceeding. On average, judges
required plaintiff fact sheets 248.8 days post-centralization,74 but called them
different things. Some referred to fact sheets as plaintiff proﬁle forms,75 which
generally required less information (and were sometimes a precursor to a fact
sheet), while others termed follow-on fact sheets a “supplemental discovery
obligation,” which required an expert report (like a Lone Pine order).76
Plaintiff fact sheets likewise varied substantially on compliance deadlines,
which spanned from thirty to 120 days.77 Although rolling deadlines make sense
given that cases enter a multidistrict proceeding at different times, deadlines
depended on everything from the ﬁrst letter of the plaintiff’s last name,78 what

72.
73.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See Engstrom, supra note 1, at 60. Engstrom notes that plaintiffs should have reasonable time
to cure deﬁciencies ﬁrst.
See id. at 37-46. Fact sheets have, however, been upheld on appellate review. See, e.g., In re
Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1237 (9th Cir. 2006); In re
Guidant Corp. Implantable Deﬁbrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 496 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2007).
This is around eight months, which is consistent with the Federal Judicial Center’s study
ﬁnding that the average time was 8.2 months. See Williams et al., supra note 71, at 3.
See, e.g., Pretrial Order No. 9 Plaintiff Proﬁle Form/Execution of Authorizations, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-01355 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2001).
See Pretrial Order No. 102, In re Baycol Prods. Litig., No. 01-md-01431 (D. Minn. Jan. 16,
2004).
BURCH, supra note 7, at 258-65.
E.g., Pretrial Order No. 18A, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-md-01657 (E.D. La. Aug.
17, 2005).
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“wave” or “phase” the plaintiff’s case fell into,79 and when the plaintiff ﬁled her
complaint,80 to the transfer date81 and whether the plaintiff entered a tolling
agreement.82
As one would expect, fact sheets sought different information. In general,
however, they requested (1) medical and pharmacy records, (2) personal
background information, and (3) a plaintiff’s litigation history—from previous
tort claims to employment lawsuits to bankruptcy.83 The ﬁrst two categories
appear tied to a hodgepodge of discovery rules, but the third makes little sense.
Prior lawsuits unrelated to the current claim are not “relevant to any party’s claim
or defense” under Rule 26, nor do they have a tendency to prove or disprove a
fact that matters under substantive tort law, likely rendering them irrelevant
under evidentiary rules.84 The only plausible inference a jury could draw from
that information would be a forbidden and often unsupportable one: that this is
an overly litigious person who probably has a frivolous claim.85
These idiosyncrasies raise the second concern: plaintiff fact sheets, like Lone
Pine orders, can be out of step with the formal procedural scheme. Their
requested content reads like a pancaked version of initial disclosures,
interrogatories, requests to produce documents, and deposition queries, but
without each rule’s prepackaged protections and limits. For instance, some
judges deem fact sheets “interrogatories” under Rule 33, which imposes a
twenty-ﬁve-question limit, including subparts. But fact sheets often exceed 100
questions and seek information that one would ordinarily expect to convey when
deposed or to send as part of Rule 26’s initial disclosures.86
In a run-of-the-mill case, parties must send initial disclosures at least
fourteen days after the Rule 26(f) conference, which occurs “as soon as
79.
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81.
82.
83.
84.

85.
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See, e.g., Pretrial Order No. 2, In re Mirapex Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07-md-01836 (D. Minn.
Sept. 5, 2007); Pretrial Order No. 4, In re Levaquin Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-md-01943 (D.
Minn. Feb. 20, 2009).
See, e.g., Pretrial Order No. 7, In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
07-md-01871 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 2008).
E.g., Case Management Order No. 2, In re Zimmer Nexgen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 1:11-cv-05468 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2011).
See e.g., Pretrial Order No. 7, supra note 75.
Williams et al., supra note 71, at 2.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); FED. R. EVID. 401. Questions about prior litigation history are likely
a relic from fact sheets’ origins in the Silica litigation. See Order No. 6 at ex. A, In re Silica
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 03-md-01553 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2004).
This inference would likely be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403’s balancing test
because it has little-to-no relevance to substantive law and any probative value would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
See e.g., Pretrial Order No. 40, In re Ethicon, Inc., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
2:12-md-02327 (S.D.W.V. Mar. 6, 2013).
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practicable.”87 And then, once served with interrogatories and requests to
produce documents, parties have thirty days to respond, unless the court orders
otherwise.88 In the usual sequencing, then, most plaintiffs will know several
months in advance what lies ahead and what documents they will likely need to
gather. But in an MDL, their case might be transferred as a “tag-along” action
such that an order for fact sheets greets them upon arrival. Most judges take care
to give these new arrivals longer deadlines, and rightfully so, but there are no
guarantees.
Timing can matter, especially when it comes to medical records and device
injuries, which can entail multiple explant surgeries, specialists, and years of
follow-up care. One pelvic-mesh plaintiff explained that she had seen over
seventy-ﬁve different doctors in thirteen years and had eight mesh-related
surgeries.89 And a 2018 study on U.S. News & World Report’s top-ranked
hospitals found that even patients with less-extensive medical histories can face
“long waiting periods and unclear request processes” for their records.90 While
some hospitals made electronic and paper records available almost immediately,
others took four to eight weeks and charged over $280 for a 200-page record.91
Even among these top hospitals, the report found “a lack of transparency” in the
request process, noncompliance with HIPAA’s recommended fees, and
“processing times longer than the state-required time.”92
When ongoing treatment and records requests pose obstacles to gathering
the information that fact sheets seek, lenience—not stricter penalties for
noncompliance—should be the norm. Yet the consequences for noncompliance
ﬂuctuated substantially.93 Most judges gave plaintiffs a chance to “cure” any

87.
88.
89.

90.
91.
92.
93.

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(2), 34(b)(2)(A).
“I have seen 8 GI doctors, 1 oncologist, 9 [OBGYNs], 2 infectious disease doctors, 1 proctologist, 3 pelvic reconstructions specialists, 2 plastic surgeons, 9 urologists, 4 dermatologists, 4
allergists, 5 physical therapists, 11 primary care providers, 1 foot doctor, 2 endocrinologists, 1
ophthalmologist, 3 rheumatologists. Then because of not being treated and gaslighted and
emotionally abused by doctors, 3 psychiatrists, 3 psychologists, 3 counselors,” she wrote. Her
identity is conﬁdential. She is one of the many amazing women with whom I have interacted
as part of an ongoing procedural justice study on women’s health multidistrict proceedings.
See Procedural Justice Study on Women’s Health Multidistrict Litigation, ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE
BURCH, https://www.elizabethchambleeburch.com/womens-mdls [https://perma.cc/5X2E
-FGBE].
Carolyn T. Lye et al., Assessment of US Hospital Compliance with Regulations for Patients’ Requests
for Medical Records, JAMA NETWORK OPEN 4-6 (Oct. 5, 2018).
Id. at 4-6.
Id. at 9.
Compare Pretrial Order No. 28, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-md-1657 (E.D. La. Nov.
9 2007) (giving plaintiffs twenty days to cure but refusing to grant any further extensions);
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errors or omissions; but others were more draconian, allowing defendants to
move to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims (without prejudice) thirty days after notifying
them.94
As a discovery tool, fact sheets should be governed by Rule 37, which sets up
a predictable—yet ﬂexible—sequence: defense counsel would move to compel
only after certifying that she ﬁrst conferred with opposing counsel in good faith.
This, one hopes, eliminates motions to compel in cases where plaintiffs
encounter roadblocks beyond their control. If defendants do move to compel,
noncompliant plaintiffs’ counsel would have an opportunity to respond and be
heard. Afterward, if a plaintiff still does not comply, the court may choose from
a menu of options ranging from striking pleadings to dismissing the action in
whole or in part.95
As fact sheets evolve through norms that operate in the shadows of formal
discovery rules, it is not just their variety and unpredictability that is
worrisome.96 Over time, as lawyers simply add to what is already there, the
questionnaires can look more like a museum storeroom and less like a
streamlined discovery tool. An early fact sheet in the Silica litigation sought just
a few pages of basic questions,97 but some recent examples span forty-eight
pages (with forms and all), exceed 100 questions, and seek ﬁfteen years of
medical history, ten years of employment history, and information on everything
from divorces to children’s names, addresses, and birthdays.98
With increased length, fact sheets’ aim may shift from discovery to
harassment—something that Engstrom cautions against and that the federal
rules committee explicitly considered when limiting parties to twenty-ﬁve
interrogatories.99 Plaintiffs’ education levels vary and not all receive attorney
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with In re Composix Kugel Hernia Repair Patch Litig., No. 04-md-1842 (D.R.I. Dec. 6, 2007).
In Kugel Mesh, the court subjected noncompliant plaintiffs to dismissal if “good cause for such
dismissal is shown,” meaning that the plaintiff failed to submit a fact sheet, failed to complete
a fact sheet, or failed to ﬁll in material aspects of the fact sheet. The defendant had to send
plaintiff’s counsel a letter of noncompliance, which triggered an additional forty-ﬁve days to
comply.
Order Regarding Completion of IH/PTC Plaintiff Fact Sheets, In re Mirena IUS Levonorgestrel-Related Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), No. 17-md-02767 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2017).
FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
See Burch & Williams, supra note 12, at 1456-59 (observing the growth of ad hoc practices).
Order No. 6, supra note 84, at ex. A.
See, e.g, Pretrial Order No. 40, supra note 86; Pretrial Order No. 2, supra note 79; In re Zimmer
Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2013).
FED. R. CIV. P. 33, 1993 advisory comm. note (“Experience in over half of the district courts
has conﬁrmed that limitations on the number of interrogatories are useful and manageable.
Moreover, because the device can be costly and may be used as a means of harassment, it is
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assistance. As representing mass-tort clients has turned into a wholesale business
for many lawyers, some plaintiffs have never even spoken with their attorney.
Third-party vendors (often owned by plaintiffs’ lawyers) have popped up to ﬁll
the gap, promising that “our Physicians in India prepare Plaintiff Fact Sheets for
$35 an hour as a billable expense.”100 So, by using a third-party service, the
money eventually comes out of plaintiffs’ pockets as a cost rather than attorneys’
contingency fees, thereby impacting plaintiffs’ bottom line. In short, while
plaintiffs’ fact sheets aim to streamline discovery, in practice, they can bypass
built-in discovery protections and impact parties disproportionately.
conclusion
It is true that multidistrict litigation should not abrogate defendants’ ability
to discover plaintiff-speciﬁc information or the basic tenet that plaintiffs must
prove their claims. But, as Engstrom acknowledges, judges should be mindful
about overtaxing plaintiffs too—whether through Lone Pine orders or plaintiff
fact sheets.101 Procedural justice dictates that procedural burdens should not fall
disproportionally on one party. Rather, rules should distribute the risks of error
and the costs of access as evenly as possible.102 Rule 26 strives to accomplish this
by requiring that discovery remain proportional to a case’s needs. But as handme-down procedures like plaintiff fact sheets and Lone Pine orders spread
through common-law norms and escape formal rules’ rigorous vetting process,
parity may dissolve.103
Where does all of this leave us? On the one hand, transferee judges are right:
every mass-tort proceeding differs in some respect, which suggests the need for
ﬂexibility over rigidity. On the other hand, when judges and parties invent
procedures for a particular proceeding, they risk focusing on the pragmatics of
that case, overlooking normative issues, and importing the baggage of their
biases and thoughts about the proceeding. Achieving neutrality, where discovery

100.
101.
102.

103.

desirable to subject its use to the control of the court consistent with the principles stated in
Rule 26(b)(2), particularly in multi-party cases . . . .”); Engstrom, supra note 1, at 60 n.247.
Plaintiff Fact Sheets, REC. REFORM, https://www.medquestltd.com/mass-torts/plaintiff-fact
-sheets [https://perma.cc/WRW5-AKMK].
Engstrom, supra note 1, at 60 n.247.
Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 257-58 (2004); Robert G. Bone,
Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U.
L. REV. 485, 514 (2003).
In the Federal Judicial Center’s study, 42% of courts required defendant fact sheets, whereas
57% required plaintiff fact sheets (87% of proceedings with 1,000 or more actions required
plaintiff fact sheets). Williams et al., supra note 71. Still, searching company databases is unlikely to be as burdensome as requiring plaintiffs to provide ﬁfteen years of pharmacy and
medical records.
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burdens and the risks of erroneous decisions fall equally on both parties, may be
hard in the heat of battle. Although design choices should respond to what is
happening on the ground, issuing a Lone Pine order or a plaintiff fact sheet does
not occur in a vacuum; those decisions have ripple effects that can impact
plaintiffs more harshly than defendants.104 If judges experiment with bespoke
procedures, they should take care to ensure a fair ﬁt for both parties that works
with—not against—off-the-rack rules.
Fuller E. Callaway Chair of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I am grateful
to Thomas Burch, Nora Freeman Engstrom, and Margaret S. Williams for their
feedback on previous drafts. Most of the court documents I cite in this Essay are available
at MDL Docs, U. GA. SCH. L., https://mdl.law.uga.edu [https://perma.cc/ W4Y2CJWL].
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See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Katherine Lehe, Uncovering Discovery, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 1,
8 n.40 (2011) (“In some cases, however, it appears to plaintiffs that the ‘fact sheet’ process
does not save them time or money, as defendants have seized and developed fact sheets as a
weapon of attrition, using shotgun ‘deﬁciencies’ (including typographical errors, failure to
provide information as to questions marked ‘N/A,’ missing middle initials, etc.) to prolong
the process and, as in PPA, to set up motions for dismissal as the ultimate sanction.”).
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Days from Centralization to LPO

MDL No.

Days from Centralization to First
Settlement

Litigation
Name

Days from Centralization to PFS
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738

659

659

1,223

1,399

629

80

1,411

1,423

248.8

1,234.70

1,411

1,414.7

1,958

1,348
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TABLE A2
JUDICIAL ASSIGNMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS IN THE MDL PRODUCTS-LIABILITY DATASET
MDL
Number

Judge

Litigation Name

Eduardo
C. Robreno

In re: Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI)

875

Aggregate
Settlement

John
Grady

In re: Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood
Products Prod. Liab. Litig.

986

Class-action
Settlement

Harvey
Bartle, III

In re: Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/
Dexfenfluramine) Prod. Liab. Litig.

1203

Class-action
Settlement

Eldon
E. Fallon

In re: Propulsid Prod. Liab. Litig.

1355

Aggregate
Settlement

Michael
James Davis

In re: Baycol Prod. Liab. Litig.

1431

Aggregate
Settlement

William
R. Wilson

In re: Prempro Prod. Liab. Litig.

1507

Aggregate
Settlement

James
Moody, Jr.

In re: Accutane (Isotrentinoin) Prod. Liab.
Litig.

1626

Defense
Win

Patti
B. Saris

In re: Neurontin Marketing, Sales Practices
and Prod. Liab. Litig.

1629

Class-action
Settlement

Eldon E. Fallon

In re: Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig.

1657

Aggregate
Settlement

Esther
Salas

In re: Ford Motor Co. E-350 Van Prod. Liab.
Litig. (No. II)

1687

Defense
Win

Bernard
Friedman

In re: Ford Motor Co. Speed Control
Deactivation Switch Prod. Liab. Litig.

1718

Defense
Win

Rodney
W. Sippel

In re: Celexa and Lexapro Prod. Liab. Litig.

1736

Individual
Settlements

David
A. Katz

In re: OrthoEvra Prod. Liab. Litig.

1742

Aggregate
Settlement

Todd
J. Campbell

In re: Aredia and Zometa Prod. Liab. Litig.

1760

Defense
Win

William
J. Martini

In re: Human Tissue Prod. Liab. Litig.

1763

Aggregate
Settlement

John F. Keenan

In re: Fosamax Prod. Liab. Litig. (MDL 1789)

1789

Aggregate
Settlement

Michael
James Davis

In re: Mirapex Prod. Liab. Litig.

1836

Aggregate
Settlement

Mary
M. Lisi

In re: Kugel Mesh Hernia Patch Prod. Liab.
Litig.

1842

Aggregate
Settlement
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Outcome
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MDL
Number

Judge

Litigation Name

Outcome

Thomas W.
Thrash, Jr.

In re: ConAgra Peanut Butter Prod. Liab. Litig.

1845

Aggregate
Settlement

Cynthia
M. Rufe

In re: Avandia Marketing Sales Practices and
Prod. Liab. Litig.

1871

Aggregate
Settlement

Kurt
D. Engelhardt

In re: FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prod. Liab.
Litig.

1873

Class-action
Settlement

Dan
A. Polster

In re: Gadolinium Contrast Dyes Prod. Liab.
Litig.

1909

Aggregate
Settlement

Donald M.
Middlebrooks

In re: Trasylol Prod. Liab. Litig.

1928

Aggregate
Settlement

John
R. Turnheim

In re: Levaquin Prod. Liab. Litig.

1943

Aggregate
Settlement

James
Carr

In re: Heparin Prod. Liab. Litig.

1953

Aggregate
Settlement

Ann D.
Montgomery

In re: Zurn Pex Plumbing Prod. Liab. Litig.

1958

Class-action
Settlement

Rodney
W. Sippel

In re: NuvaRing Prod. Liab. Litig.

1964

Aggregate
Settlement

Ortrie
D. Smith

In re: Bisphenol-A (BPA) Polycarbonate
Plastics Prod. Liab. Litig.

1967

Class-action
Settlement

Christopher
A. Boyko

In re: Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer
Prod. Liab. Litig.

2001

Class-action
Settlement

Clay
D. Land

In re: Mentor Corp. ObTape Transobuturator
Sling Prod. Liab. Litig.

2004

Aggregate
Settlement

Andrew
J. Guilford

In re: Land Rover LR3 Tire Wear Products
Liability Litigation

2008

Class-action
Settlement

Brian
M. Cogan

In re: Bayer Corp. Combination Asprin Prod.
Marketing and Sales Practices Litig.

2023

Class-action
Settlement

James
Ware

In re: Apple iPhone 3G Products Liability
Litigation

2045

Defense
Win

Eldon
E. Fallon

In re: Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prod.
Liab. Litig.

2047

Class-action
Settlement

Cecilia
M. Altonaga

In re: Denture Cream Products Liab. Litig.

2051

Defense
Win

Inge P. Johnson

In re: Chantix Prod. Liab. Litig

2092

Aggregate
Settlement

David
R. Herndon

In re: Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone)
Marketing , Sales Practices Prod. Liab. Litig.

2100

Aggregate
Settlement
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MDL
Number

Outcome

In re: IKO Roofing Shingle Prod. Liab. Litig.

2104

Ongoing

James
V. Selna

In re: Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended
Acceleration Marketing, Sales Practices, and
Products Liab. Litig.

2151

Class-action
Settlement

Susan
D. Wigenton

In re: Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prod. Liab.
Litig.

2158

Aggregate
Settlement

Cormac
J. Carney

In re: Toyota Motor Corp. Hybrid Brake
Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liab.
Litig.

2172

Defense
Win

Carl
J. Barbier

In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater
Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20,
2010

2179

Class-action
Settlement

Joseph
R. Goodwin

In re: C.R. Bard, Inc., Pelvic Repair System
Prod. Liab. Litig.

2187

Aggregate
Settlement

Ronald
Whyte

In re: Apple Inc. iPhone 4 Marketing, Sales
Practices & Prod. Liab. Lit.

2188

Class-action
Settlement

David
A. Katz

In re: DePuy Orthopaedics Inc., ASR Hip
Implant Prod. Liab. Litig.

2197

Aggregate
Settlement

Matthew
F. Kennelley

In re: Navistar 6.0 Diesel Engine Prod. Liab.
Litig.

2223

Class-action
Settlement

Danny
C. Reeves

In re: Darvocet, Darvon and Propoxyphene
Prod. Liab. Litig.

2226

Defense
Win

Gregory
L. Frost

In re: Porsche Cars North America Inc. Plastic
Coolant Tubes Prod. Liab. Litig.

2233

Class-action
Settlement

Freda
Wolfson105

In re: Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prod.
Liab. Litig. (No. II)

2243

Ongoing

James Edgar
Kinkeade

In re: DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip
Implant Prod. Liab. Litig.

2244

Ongoing

Rebecca
R. Pallmeyer

In re: Zimmer Nexgen Knee Implant Prod.
Liab. Litig.

2272

Aggregate
Settlement

J. Michelle
Childs

In re: Building Materials Corporation of
America Asphalt Roofing Shingle Prod. Liab.
Litig.

2283

Class-action
Settlement

Gene
E. K. Pratter

In re: Imprelis Herbicide Marketing, Sales
Practice, and Prod. Liab. Litig.

2284

Class-action
Settlement

Judge

Litigation Name

Michael
P. McCuskey

105.
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MDL
Number

Judge

Litigation Name

Rebecca
F. Doherty

In re: Actos (Pioglitazone) Prod. Liab. Litig.

2299

Aggregate
Settlement

Thomas
B. Russell

In re: Skechers Toning Shoe Prod. Liab.Litig.

2308

Class-action
Settlement

Benita
Y. Pearson

In re: Ford Motor Co. Spark Plug and 3-Valve
Engine Prod. Liab. Litig.

2316

Class-action
Settlement

Joseph
R. Goodwin

In re: American Medical Systems Inc., Pelvic
Repair System, Prod. Liab. Litig.

2325

Aggregate
Settlement

Joseph
R. Goodwin

In re: Boston Scientific Corp Pelvic Repair Sys.
Prods. Liab. Litig.

2326

Aggregate
Settlement

Joseph
R. Goodwin

In re: Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods.
Liab. Litig.

2327

Aggregate
Settlement

William
S. Duffey, Jr.

In re: Wright Medical Technology, Inc.,
Conserve Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig.

2329

Aggregate
Settlement

Brian
M. Cogan106

In re: Propecia (Finasteride) Prod. Liab. Litig.

2331

Ongoing

David
C. Norton

In re: MI Windows & Doors, Inc., Prod. Liab.
Litig.

2333

Class-action
Settlement

Cynthia
M. Rufe

In re: Zoloft (Sertraline Hydrochloride) Prod.
Liab. Litig.

2342

Defense
Win

Matthew
F. Kennelley

In re: Watson Fentanyl Patch Prod. Liab. Litig.

2372

Aggregate
Settlement

David
R. Herndon

In re: Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prod.
Liab. Litig.

2385

Aggregate
Settlement

Joseph
R. Goodwin

In re: Coloplast Corp. Pelvic Support Sys.
Prods. Liab. Litig.

2387

Aggregate
Settlement

Robert
L. Miller, Jr.

In re: Biomet M2a Magnum Hip Implant
Prod. Liab. Litig.

2391

Aggregate
Settlement

Dale
S. Fischer

In re: Nexium (Esomeprazole) Products
Liability Litigation

2404

Defense
Win

Freda
L. Wolfson

In re: Plavix Marketing, Sales Practices & Prod.
Liab. Litig. (No. II)

2418

Ongoing

F. Dennis Saylor

In re: New England Compounding Pharmacy,
Inc. Prod. Liab. Litig.

2419

Bankruptcy

Douglas
P. Woodlock

In re: Fresenius GranuFlo/NaturaLyte
Dialysate Prod. Liab. Litig.

2428

Aggregate
Settlement

106.

Outcome

Reassigned from John Gleeson.
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MDL
Number

Outcome

In re: Mirena IUD Prod. Liab. Litig.

2434

Defense
Win

In re: Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Marketing,
Sales Practices and Prod. Liab. Litig.

2436

Aggregate
Settlement

Judge

Litigation Name

Cathy Seibel
Lawrence
F. Stengel
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